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Abstract 
Christian teachers are often encouraged to use 
Jesus’ teaching strategies as models for their own 
pedagogy. Jesus frequently utilized analogical 
comparisons, or parables, to help his learners 
understand elements of his Gospel message. 
Although teachers can use analogical models to 
facilitate comprehension, such models also can sow 
the seeds of confusion and misconception. Recent 
advances in cognitive psychology have provided 
new theoretical frameworks to help us understand 
how instructional analogies function in the 
teaching-learning process. The goal of this paper is 
to analyze Jesus’ analogical teaching from these 
psychological perspectives, with implications for all 
teachers who utilize instructional analogies. In 
addition to reviewing basic analogical learning 
processes, I explore a six-variable model to account 
systematically for potential analogical 
misconceptions. 
Introduction 
With many similar parables Jesus spoke the word to 
them, as much as they could understand. He did not 
say anything to them without using a parable. Mark 
4:33-34 
Interdomain instructional analogies are powerful 
tools for teaching and learning. An interdomain 
instructional analogy juxtaposes two knowledge 
domains that bear little or no surface similarity but 
share a common relational structure. Numerous 
research studies have demonstrated the instructional 
effectiveness of interdomain analogies in promoting 
learning, understanding, and conceptual change 
(Dagher, 1995; Mayer, 1989; Zook, 1991). 
However, teaching and learning by analogy is not 
without its risks, for research findings also clearly 
indicate that analogies place increased cognitive 
processing demands on learners and can encourage 
them to form misconceptions and faulty mental 
models when they transfer (or map) the wrong ideas 
from one domain to another—that is, when they 
attempt to extend the analogy too far (Brown & 
Clement, 1989; Gentner & Gentner, 1983; Zook, 
1993; Zook & Di Vesta, 1991; Zook & Maier, 
1994). Ironically, an interdomain instructional 
analogy can at once facilitate meaningful learning 
and promote confusion and misunderstanding. By 
all accounts, analogies appear to function as double-
edged instructional swords. 
This double-edged instructional sword is the very 
strategy that Jesus employed repeatedly to reveal 
principles of the Gospel to people of his time and 
future generations. Jesus taught in parables, and 
parables are fundamentally instructional analogies. 
Although Biblical scholars have readily 
acknowledged the teaching function of Jesus’ 
parables (Hultgren, 2000; Zuck, 1995), their 
analyses have routinely ignored this instructional 
perspective—most likely due to the lack of an 
adequate psychological framework to account for 
internal analogical learning processes. The goal of 
this paper is to demonstrate how emerging 
psychological perspectives on analogical learning 
processes should inform our understanding of the 
Gospel message that Jesus taught by parable and 
influence our use of instructional analogies as 
teaching strategies. 
Thinking and Learning by Analogy 
The fundamental feature of analogical thinking and, 
therefore, learning by parable, is relational 
comparison. Analogical similarity is ” . . . a special 
kind of similarity which is the similarity of 
structure, the similarity of form, a similarity of 
constellation between two sets of structures, two 
sets of particulars, that are manifestly different but 
have structural parallels” (Oppenheimer, 1956, p. 
129). When people think by analogy, they assert 
that two situations are similar because their 
underlying relationships are similar—not because 
their surface features are similar (Holyoak, Gentner, 
& Kokinov, 2001). 
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The word “parable” is derived from the Greek word 
“parabole” (Hultgren, 2000; Zuck, 1995). This word 
is comprised of two roots, “para,” which means 
“beside or alongside,” and “ballein,” which means 
“to throw.” Thus the Greek word “parabole” 
literally means “to throw beside or alongside” 
(Zuck, 1995), and the word “parable” refers to 
placing two ideas alongside each other for the 
purpose of comparison. The comparison usually is 
made between a familiar object or event and a less 
familiar idea, truth, or principle. Despite differences 
in scholarly definitions and classification categories, 
all parables possess the fundamental feature of 
analogy: nonliteral relational comparison (Sider, 
1995). 
Proportional and Interdomain Analogies 
Proportional analogies take the generalized form of 
A:B::C:D (A is to B as C is to D), where A, B, C, 
and D are specific numerals, words, or objects. The 
basis for the comparison is the equivalent 
relationship that holds between AB and CD (A:B = 
C:D). As illustrated in Figure 1, to understand a 
proportional analogy, the thinker must induce the 
relationship between A and B and then transfer, or 
map, that relationship to C and D (Pellegrino, 1985; 
Sternberg, 1977; Sternberg & Nigro, 1980). 
 
According to Sider (1995), all of Jesus’ parables 
can be reduced to proportional analogies. For 
example, in the Parable of the Thief (Luke 12:39-
40) Jesus places the relationship between the owner 
of a house and the coming of a thief equal to that of 
his disciples and his coming (house owner : coming 
of thief = disciples : coming of the Son of man). 
Jesus uses a familiar domain of thieves breaking 
into houses to promote understanding of a less 
familiar domain, the coming of the Son of man. In 
both domains, the underlying point, or common 
relation, is readiness for the unexpected (Sider, 
1995). 
Cognitive psychologists usually refer to the familiar 
domain as the “base” and the less familiar domain 
as the “target.” Thus, to understand Jesus’ meaning 
in the Parable of the Thief, the listener or reader 
needs to induce the base domain relation (the house 
owner should be ready for the unexpected breaking 
in of a thief) and map that relation to the target 
domain (the disciples should be ready for the 
unexpected coming of the Son of man). 
Although Jesus’ parables can be reduced to 
proportional analogies, they are presented in the 
Gospels in more complex form as interdomain 
instructional analogies. Whereas proportional 
analogies are based on a single common relation, 
interdomain analogies represent comparisons 
between different knowledge domains on the basis 
of a set of common relations (Holland, Holyoak, 
Nisbett, & Thagard, 1986). Interdomain analogies 
present to learners a greater number of objects and 
possible relations to map. The primary difficulty 
learners experience when processing an interdomain 
instructional analogy is deciding which aspects of 
the base domain to map to the target domain (Zook, 
1991). This is a nontrivial decision because the 
resulting understanding, or conceptualization, of the 
target domain can be enhanced or impeded 
depending on the specific information selected for 
mapping. 
Many of Jesus’ parables would be appropriately 
classified as interdomain instructional analogies. 
Consider, for example, the Parable of the Prodigal 
Son. Jesus does not present a simple analogy in 
proportional form: prodigal son:father::sinner who 
repents:God. Instead, he places the primary objects 
of the base domain (son, father) in an embellished 
context of additional objects (e.g., the son’s 
employer, pigs, an envious older brother, a fattened 
calf, a robe, a ring, the father’s servants). Although 
the embellishment adds interest and a rich narrative 
context, it also introduces a host of object features 
and relations that could be potentially mapped from 
base to target. For example, when the prodigal son 
repents, his father gives him concrete gifts (robe, 
ring). When sinners repent, does God bring concrete 
rewards such as money and material goods into 
their lives? The answer to that question depends 
upon whether or not “the giving of material gifts” is 
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a base domain relation that is appropriate to map to 
the target domain. 
Structure-Mapping Theory 
What, then, are the mechanisms that determine if a 
relation induced in an analogy’s base domain is, 
indeed, mappable to the target domain? According 
to Gentner’s (1980, 1983, 1986) structure-mapping 
theory, interdomain analogies present three types of 
potential mappings (see Figure 2): object attributes, 
first-order relations, and higher-order systems of 
relations. Object attributes are the literal surface 
features of specific objects found in the base 
domain. First-order relations are relationships 
between objects. Higher-order systems of relations 
are sets of first-order relations that are held 
together, or constrained, by superordinate relations. 
According to structure-mapping theory, learners are 
most likely to map higher-order systems of relations 
rather than isolated (i.e., nonsystem) first-order 
relations or surface object attributes. Gentner refers 
to this human tendency as the “systematicity 
principle.” As a relational system is mapped, 
isolated first-order base relations that are not 
constrained by the same superordinate relation are 
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Structure-Mapping and Analogical 
Misconception 
Gentner’s structure-mapping theory provides a 
useful framework for understanding how learners 
(or the hearers of a parable) might transfer their 
knowledge of a familiar base domain to their 
emerging conceptualization of an unfamiliar target 
domain. However, the theory also suggests several 
sources of misconception (Zook, 1991). Although 
the theory asserts that learners tend to disregard 
surface object attributes and nonsystem relations, 
some learners may, in fact, select those 
inappropriate features for mapping—particularly 
when they are completely unfamiliar with the target 
domain. Furthermore, complex base domains may 
actually suggest more than one system of relations, 
presenting the possibility that learners could map 
the relational system intended by the analogy as 
well as an alternative system that does not 
contribute to the analogy’s instructional purpose. 
When such features are mapped by learners, they 
encourage the construction of target domain 
misconceptions. Even when instructional analogies 
do not mention or emphasize base domain object 
attributes or nonsystem relations, learners may still 
draw from their own personal schemas, or prior 
knowledge, and select this information for mapping. 
Ironically, when analogies (or parables) are used for 
teaching, they open windows for understanding 
while simultaneously sowing the seeds of 
misunderstanding. The potential for analogical 
misconceptions has been documented by a number 
of research studies (e.g., Duit, Roth, Komorek, & 
Wilbers, 2001; Mason, 1994; Zook & Di Vesta, 
1991). Findings from these studies suggest that 
when learners are confronted by a completely 
unfamiliar target domain, they may inappropriately 
map base features simply because they have no 
alternative source of information and must rely 
solely on the model provided by the base domain. 
The analogical model is stored in memory and 
becomes available for constructing inferences when 
the opportunity or need arises—that is, when the 
learner tries to use it to generate an inference 
(Anderson & Thompson, 1989; Donnelly & 
McDaniel, 1993; Mayer, 1989; Zook, 1993; Zook & 
Di Vesta, 1991; Zook & Maier, 1994) or solve a 
new problem (Gentner & Gentner, 1983). Thus, 
analogically based misconceptions can, in a sense, 
lie “dormant” until a precipitating problem or 
situation stimulates recall of the base domain and 
the learner attempts to “run” the mental model that 
it provides (Mayer, 1989; Newby, Ertmer, & 
Stepich, 1995). 
Structure-Mapping Theory and the Parable of 
the Prodigal Son 
If parables are, indeed, best considered interdomain 
instructional analogies, then readers should be able 
to analyze their potential effects on understanding 
and misconception by applying the assumptions of 
structure-mapping theory. For the purpose of the 
present preliminary analysis, I will apply structure-
mapping theory to the Parable of the Prodigal Son. 
The story is recorded in Luke 15:11-31 as the last 
parable in a set of three: the Lost Sheep, the Lost 
Coin, and the Lost Son. All three analogies are used 
by Jesus to illustrate a single common principle, 
which he states explicitly after each of the first two 
parables: “. . . there will be more rejoicing in 
heaven over one sinner who repents than over 
ninety-nine righteous persons who do not need to 
repent” (Luke 15:7) and “. . . there is rejoicing in 
the presence of the angels of God over one sinner 
who repents” (Luke 15:10). Jesus offers these 
particular analogies in response to a criticism levied 
at him by the Pharisees: “This man welcomes 
sinners and eats with them” (Luke 15:2). Thus, the 
central theme of all three parables should be clear 
from the context and Jesus’ explicit statements: God 
delights in people who recognize their sinfulness 
and come to him in repentance more than those who 
consider themselves righteous. With respect to 
structure-mapping theory, the parable suggests the 
following object correspondences: 
base domain target domain 
father = God 
son = repentant sinner 
brother = the self-righteous 
The relational system that Jesus intends to be 
mapped is comprised of several first-order relations 
that are constrained by the superordinate concepts 
of unconditional love (the father toward the son) 
and envy (the brother toward the son). Each of the 
six relations identified below is consistent with—
and supports—the central theme that Jesus states. 
Notice how each of the base domain relations can 
be expressed in the target domain simply by 
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replacing the relevant base objects (in bold) with 
their corresponding target objects. 
base domain target domain 
son leaves 
his father’s care and 
expectations 
sinner leaves God’s car
e and expectations 
son returns to father in 
repentance 
sinner returns 
to God in repentance 
father grants 
forgiveness to son 
God grants forgiveness 
to repentant sinner 
father celebrates son’s r
eturn 
God celebrates repenta
nt sinner’s return 
brother obeys and 
works for father 
self-righteous obey and 
work for God 
brother resents father’s
 acceptance of son 
self-
righteous resent God’s 
acceptance of repentant 
sinner 
As the relational system described above is mapped 
to the target, surface features of base domain 
objects should be ignored. In Jesus’ telling of the 
story, for example, several attributes of the father 
are noted. He is wealthy, holds property, and 
employs men and servants. Although these details 
contribute to the narrative, they do not contribute to 
the relational system and, therefore, should not be 
mapped as characteristics of God. 
Finally, the story also suggests additional first-order 
relations that are separate (or isolated) from the 
mappable relational system. For example, the 
envious brother is older than the wayward son. 
Although this valid relation is made explicit in the 
story, it is not constrained by the relational system 
and, therefore, should not be mapped. For example, 
it would be inappropriate to infer that self-righteous 
folk are always older than repentant sinners because 
the envious brother is older than the wayward son. 
As our analysis of the Parable of the Prodigal Son 
demonstrates, the assumptions of structure-mapping 
theory can provide a useful framework for 
considering both the learning intended by the story 
as well as the misunderstanding that might be 
generated from the story by hearers, readers, and 
interpreters who would make inappropriate 
mapping decisions. However, the theory alone does 
not help us predict the circumstances under which 
such inappropriate mappings might actually occur. 
To investigate this important question, I turn to 
Zook and Maier’s (1994) six-variable model of 
analogical misconception formation. 
Analogical Misconceptions: A Six-Variable 
Model 
Zook and Maier (1994) developed and tested a six-
variable model to account systematically for the 
formation of analogical misconceptions. According 
to the model, both learner and instructional 
variables interact during the mapping process (see 
Figure 3). Learner variables include (a) analogical 
reasoning ability, (b) domain-specific knowledge, 
and (c) processing goals. Instructional variables 
include (a) analogy content, (b) analogy complexity, 
and (c) mapping support. In the remainder of this 
section, I will examine each of the model’s six 
variables and briefly explore their potential 
implications for parable interpretation and teaching 
by analogy. 
Learner Variables: Analogical Reasoning Ability 
Analogical reasoning ability is a general variable 
that refers to how well learners can execute 
component analogical processes such as inducing 
relations between base objects and mapping those 
relations to corresponding target domain objects 
(Sternberg, 1977). From studies with proportional 
analogies, researchers know that individuals differ 
greatly in their abilities to perform these component 
processes and, hence, their abilities to learn from 
interdomain instructional analogies, which share 
similar processing requirements (Holland et al., 
1986; Pellegrino, 1985). 
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Thinking analogically requires the ability to 
understand abstract word meanings and induce 
relationships between those meanings, a general 
cognitive capability often referred to as verbal 
aptitude. Verbal aptitude appears to influence 
learners’ mapping decisions (Zook, 1993; Zook & 
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Maier, 1994) and their analogical problem-solving 
abilities (Corkill & Fager, 1995). 
A second variable related to analogical reasoning 
ability is learner age. Advances in analogical 
reasoning abilities with increasing age are a well-
documented phenomenon. Children tend to 
demonstrate difficulties in understanding 
proportional analogies and solving problems 
analogically prior to adolescence (Bisanz, Bisanz, & 
LeFevre, 1984; Gentner & Toupin, 1986; Goldman, 
Pellegrino, Parseghian, & Sallis, 1982; Holyoak, 
Junn, & Billman, 1984; Sternberg & Rifkin, 1979). 
Young children typically base their interpretations 
of analogies on the salient surface features of base 
domain objects rather than abstract structural 
relationships. Eventually, children’s interpretations 
of analogies change from this focus on literal 
features to a deeper relational comparison. Gentner 
(1988) documented this developmental change and 
referred to it as the “relational shift.” Zook and 
Maier (1994) found that the relational shift has 
implications not only for proportional analogies and 
analogical problem solving, but also for learning 
from interdomain instructional analogies. 
Parable interpretation and analogical learning are 
susceptible to differences in the verbal aptitudes of 
specific interpreters and learners. The interpreters of 
parables and other instructional analogies can range 
from well-educated scholars who possess, 
presumably, high degrees of verbal aptitude to less-
educated individuals who read the parables in the 
Gospels and young children who hear parables in 
children’s sermons and Sunday school lessons. The 
meanings of parables and the subsequent inferences 
that are constructed from them by learners who vary 
in age and verbal aptitude will also vary 
accordingly. Furthermore, the historical and current 
temptation to propose allegorical parable 
interpretations that focus on literal object 
similarities may be a reflection of analogical 
reasoning difficulty rather than special theological 
insight. 
Learner Variables: Domain-Specific Knowledge 
The ability to manipulate word meanings is useless 
without word meanings to manipulate! Thus, 
another important source of variation in the 
mapping process is the differential quantity and 
quality of domain-specific knowledge that learners 
possess. When educators teach by analogy, or 
parable, they assume that learners already possess a 
meaningful representation of the base domain of the 
analogy. Even though the analogy may be a “good” 
one in the sense that it suggests a deep relational 
comparison, learners will not be able to make use of 
it unless their representation of the base domain 
includes the critical features to be mapped 
(Hardiman, Well, & Pollatsek, 1984). Without pre-
existing base-domain knowledge, it is impossible 
for learners to abstract a relational structure to be 
mapped. In the absence of a relational structure, or 
schema, learners may direct their attention more 
toward salient surface features that they associate 
with base objects (Robins & Mayer, 1993). 
The domain-specific knowledge variable is 
particularly significant for parable interpretation. 
Jesus used base domain objects and events that 
should have been familiar and readily 
understandable to his first-century audience: 
mustard seeds, wineskins, sowing seed, forgiving 
fathers, and so on. As people move farther away in 
time and geographic context from the original 
cultural setting in which Jesus taught, these 
familiar, well-known objects become less familiar 
and—in some cases—completely unknown, making 
the induction of a relational schema all but 
impossible. Furthermore, some hearers and readers 
of Jesus’ parables—both past and present—may 
lack a particular understanding of a base object 
necessary for understanding the point of the parable, 
though the object may be familiar. For example, 
consider the Parable of the Prodigal Son. Learners 
who do not understand the father’s unconditional 
love for his wayward son because they have not 
experienced that love from their own fathers may 
have difficulty inducing and mapping the relational 
schema that Jesus intended. 
Learner Variables: Processing Goals 
A third variable that affects analogical mapping is 
the nature of the learner’s purpose in processing the 
analogy. The results of studies by Zook and Di 
Vesta (1991), Zook (1993), and Zook and Maier 
(1994) all suggest that learners make mapping 
decisions based on their perceptions of the purpose 
of the analogy. These studies consistently found that 
learners were more likely to refrain from mapping 
inappropriate base features when the purpose of the 
analogy was made clear to them. Understanding the 
purpose of the analogy helps to provide the 
superordinant system constraint identified in 
Gentner’s (1983) structure-mapping theory. 
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Jesus often made the instructional purposes of his 
parables clear by stating them explicitly. According 
to Zuck (1995), Jesus used several strategies to 
make his learning goals apparent to his listeners: (a) 
beginning the story with a question (e.g., Matthew 
11:16; Luke 13:20), (b) beginning a story with a 
statement and rhetorical question (e.g., Matthew 
24:44-51; Luke 14:28-30), and (c) concluding a 
story with a statement of the main point that made 
the application clear (e.g., Luke 10:36; Luke 11:5-9; 
Luke 16:13). Zuck (1995) notes that Jesus made the 
application of his parables explicit fourteen times. A 
reader who adopts Jesus’ instructional purpose in 
relaying the Parable of the Prodigal Son is less 
likely to attend to surface features such as the robe 
and ring that the father gives to the son as an 
expression of his joy. In contrast, a reader who 
approaches the parable for the purpose of justifying 
a materialistic lifestyle may be tempted to use those 
surface features to make questionable target domain 
inferences concerning the rewards that accrue when 
people come to God in repentance. 
Instructional Variables: Analogy Content 
Analogy content refers to the target domain 
information to be learned and, more importantly, 
the base domain analog that is selected for relational 
comparison. In addition to helping learners connect 
new information to prior knowledge (Cardinale, 
1992-1993; Simons, 1984), analogies also facilitate 
the process of knowledge restructuring (Vosniadou 
& Brewer, 1987). By forcing learners to consider 
the equivalence of two superficially disparate 
knowledge domains, they are encouraged to change 
their knowledge so it is organized around deeper 
relational ideas rather than salient superficial 
objects. Such knowledge restructuring is most likely 
when the surface features of the base and target are 
as different as possible. 
Analogies that have readily apparent object 
correspondences have “high transparency”—that is, 
the learner has little difficulty understanding how 
the base and target are similar because the objects, 
themselves, are somewhat similar (Gentner & 
Toupin, 1986). For example, the Parable of the 
Prodigal Son would be considered a high-
transparency analogy because fathers and sons share 
many of the surface features of God (often thought 
of as “heavenly father”) and sinners (often referred 
to as “children of God”). Given these obvious 
similarities, it is not difficult to perceive the 
correspondence between God and the father 
described in the parable and sinners and the 
parable’s repentant son. In contrast, the Parable of 
the Mustard Seed (Matthew 13:31-32) would be 
classified as a low-transparency analogy because a 
mustard seed shares no surface similarity with the 
abstract concept of the kingdom of heaven. A 
learner must work much harder to determine the 
appropriate object correspondences in a low-
transparency parable such as the Mustard Seed than 
a high-transparency parable such as the Prodigal 
Son. Difficulties in establishing appropriate object 
correspondences in low-transparency analogies may 
produce subsequent mapping difficulties and target 
domain misconceptions. 
Instructional Variables: Analogy Complexity 
Analogy complexity refers to the quantity of 
features that are available to learners for mapping: 
object attributes, mappable relational systems, 
alternative relational systems, and nonsystem first-
order relations. The greater the complexity (i.e., the 
quantity of base features), the greater the potential 
for learners to direct their attention away from the 
relevant relational system and, hence, for target 
domain misconceptions to occur (Zook, 1993; Zook 
& Di Vesta, 1991; Zook & Maier, 1994). Although 
the complexity of an analogy is determined 
primarily by the base analog that is selected, the 
learner’s prior knowledge of the base domain can 
provide additional objects, attributes, and relations 
as candidates for potential mapping. 
The parables of Jesus vary greatly in complexity. 
Some parabolic sayings are simple metaphors (e.g., 
“the kingdom of heaven is like yeast,” “you are the 
salt of the earth”), and some are more embellished 
stories with narrative details (e.g., the Prodigal Son, 
the Sower). Even when the base analogs offered by 
Jesus are not terribly complex, they have the 
potential to grow in complexity in the hands of 
creative interpreters or preachers who use their 
personal prior knowledge and exegetical 
perspectives to suggest additional objects and 
relations that may be related only tangentially—if at 
all—to the parable’s instructional purpose. 
Instructional Variables: Mapping Support 
Finally, the degree of mapping support provided in 
the instructional setting can influence learners’ 
mapping decisions. Mapping support can take the 
form of direct and explicit cues concerning the 
analogy’s purpose, cautions against mapping 
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inappropriate features, and identifying for learners 
the specific relations to be transferred from base to 
target. Certainly, in the Gospel parables, Jesus 
demonstrates mapping support frequently—
although not always—by making explicit the 
purpose of the parable, stating the principle to be 
learned, or explaining the analogy thoroughly (e.g., 
the Parable of the Weeds, Matthew 13:36-43). 
Jesus also demonstrates another powerful strategy 
for providing mapping support: multiple analogs. 
Presenting more than one base forces learners to 
induce a relational schema that is common to all the 
analogs rather than focusing on the details of a 
single analog. Research studies have consistently 
demonstrated the value of multiple analogs in 
facilitating learning and reducing the incidence of 
analogical misconception (Dagher, 1995; Gentner, 
Loewenstein, & Thompson, 2003; Spiro, Feltovich, 
Coulson, & Anderson, 1989). Interestingly, Jesus 
appears to use this strategy naturally at several 
points in the Gospels. For example, as already 
indicated, the Parable of the Prodigal Son actually 
represents the third base analog that Jesus compares 
to God’s love for sinners. By deliberately providing 
three very different analogs (sheep, coin, son) for 
the same target domain principle, Jesus helps his 
hearers focus on the critical relational schema to be 
mapped rather than the particulars of each 
individual analog. 
Summary and Conclusions 
In this paper, I have explored a new focus for 
inquiry concerning Jesus’ parables by 
demonstrating how recent theoretical ideas and 
research findings can help to explain and predict 
potential difficulties in parable interpretation and 
learning by analogy. The facilitative effects of 
instructional analogies and, by extension, the 
Gospel parables, has been clearly documented. 
However, learning by analogy—and by parable—is 
fraught with numerous difficulties and dangers. 
These dangers appear to be mediated by complex 
interactions between both learner and instructional 
variables. Given the number and complexity of 
variables and interactions that can influence the 
mapping process and, hence, analogically 
constructed understanding, it is not surprising that 
parable study remains a robust field that continues 
to attract people with different perspectives and, 
therefore, different interpretations. The empirical 
and theoretical evidence presented in this paper 
suggests that any analogy study is incomplete 
unless the interpreter considers learner and 
instructional variables that may influence mapping 
processes and the resulting meanings that are 
constructed. 
Jesus’ parables are instructional analogies and, 
therefore, can—and should—be analyzed from an 
instructional and psychological perspective. 
Although such analyses may not radically change 
the interpretations that are constructed by different 
people who bring their different perspectives (or 
learner variables) to the enterprise, they at least may 
help readers better understand the reasons why such 
varied interpretations may be generated. As I have 
demonstrated from psychological evidence, 
constructing theological understanding from Jesus’ 
parables—doing theology by analogy—is risky 
business, and it is made all the more dangerous 
when readers ignore the cognitive processes that 
account for analogical learning. 
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